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1. INTRODUCTION: ‘HIJAB VS. GENDER EQUALITY’ 
 
This article discusses one of the most controversial issues concerning accommodation of 
religious pluralism in Europe today: the accommodation of Islamic dress codes for girls and 
women in public educational institutions. Two rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights, ‘Dahlab versus Switzerland’ (2001), on a teacher’s right to wear the religious 
headscarf and ‘Sahin v Turkey’ (2004/2005), on a student’s right to wear the headscarf, 
concluded that such expressions of the right to religious manifestation might legitimately be 
restricted by member states.1 In Dahlab, the Court upheld the judgment of the Swiss court 
that gave priority to the right of pupils to receive education in a religiously neutral context 
over the teacher’s freedom to manifest her religion. In Sahin, the Court accepted the reasons 
for the Turkish ban on wearing religious symbols in institutions of higher education, including 
the constitutionally grounded principle of secularity, and the strong political significance of 
religious symbols in the Turkish context. Leyla Sahin left Turkey to finish her education in 
Austria. Her case was tried also by the court Grand Chamber, and has, in spite of Turkey’s 
claims to unique context, the probable implication that states might (anyhow) be given a large 
margin of appreciation on the issue of religious attire in public schools. There is, according to 
the court, no minimum standard observable in Europe for the accommodation of such 
religious manifestations. Neither will the court, apparently, contribute to establish it. 2    
In controversies over girls’ and women’s religious attire, a range of liberal principles 
are activated: state neutrality, gender equality, religious freedom, multicultural 
accommodation. Controversies are played out on a number of societal arenas: in schools, 
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1 ECrtHR 15 February 2001, Dhalab v Switzerland and ECrtHR 10 November 2005 Sahin v Turkey; all decisions 
by the ECrtHR can be accessed through its website: www.hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
2cf. T.LOENEN,  ‘Women caught between religion and equality? Developments in international and European 
human rights law’., To appear in: S.CABBIBIO and K.E. BØRRESEN(eds.) ,The Impact of Cultural and Religious 
GenderModels in the European Formation of Socio-Political Human Rights. (Rome- Herder, 2006). It seems 
that the Court will be reluctant to get in the way of the national authorities’ assessment whether a ban is 
‘necessary’ or not, which then will mean that the decision on the limits put on religious manifestations is left 
largely at the national level. 
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work places, public offices – in parliaments and in courts. Through its headscarf rulings, the 
ECrtHR has taken a stance in these general political debates. This is because the court through 
its rulings also sanctions a general perception of the headscarf controversy as one of a clash 
between antagonistic value systems: the religious gender hierarchy within Islam versus 
secular gender equality rights. Wearing a headscarf appears ‘to be imposed on women by a 
religious precept that is hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality’, the court 
maintains.  This juxtaposition, which was also used by the Turkish state in the Sahin case, 
seems to be repeating a remark first made by the Swiss Federal Court in the Dahlab case: 
 
‘It must also be acknowledged that it is difficult to reconcile the wearing of a 
headscarf with the principle of gender equality… which is a fundamental value of our 
society enshrined in a specific provision of the Federal Constitution (Article 4 § 2) and 
must be taken into account by schools.’ 3 
But many European countries, with expressed commitments to gender equality and legal 
protections against gender based, ethnic and religious discrimination, have not identified the 
issue of religious attire similarly – that is, as an issue of conflicting rights. In this article, the 
‘value conflict’ assessment sanctioned by the ECrtHR is critically discussed in section 2 and 
3. Section 4 outlines state approaches to religious attire in the public classroom in different 
European countries, concentrated on regulations concerning pupils’ and students’ religious 
dress, mainly based on information provided in Sahin. The VEIL project, a new EU financed 
research project on religious attire, identifies three main categories of state approaches: 
established restrictive bans, soft, selective regulations, and no restrictive regulations.4 I use 
these categories to evaluate the claim of the ECrtHR that regulations on religious attire vary 
widely across Europe, which is one of the stated premises for the acceptance of national 
restrictions. This evaluation actually points in the opposite direction. The standard approach 
in European member states is to allow headscarves worn by pupils and students.  
Furthermore, in section 5, I present an example of a headscarf ban assessment which 
runs contrary to the ECrtHR’s general evaluation of the relationship between religious 
headscarves and gender equality. This example addresses use of hijab in the work place. It 
does not address educational institutions and teaching situations as such. But it specifically 
addresses the issue of gender equality values. In Norway, the Gender Equality Ombud has 
found bans of headscarves in two private enterprises to be in violation of the indirect 
discrimination clause in the Gender Equality Act. In clear contrast to the approach taken by 
the ECrtHR, the right to wear the headscarf to work is here treated as an issue of parallel and 
‘intersecting’ equality rights:  women’s equal rights to religious manifestation and to non 
discrimination in the work place. Finally, section 6 investigates some new developments in 
national policies on pupils’ religious attire, where basically liberal approaches to religious 
dress in public schools nevertheless differentiate between headscarves on the one hand, and 
full body covering which includes face veils on the other hand. The new drawing of a 
demarcation line for ‘acceptable’ religious manifestations by pupils and students, still presents 
a soft, selective form of regulation compared to blanket bans on religious dress. Through this 
kind of differentiated approach, a more sensible compromise might be found on the continued 
controversies over religious dress policies in public schools.    
  
2. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM  
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in Europe.  Proposal, EU research arena 7.2.1., Birgit Sauer and Siegelinde Rosenberger, April 2005. 
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State policy on religious pluralism is often held to be dependent on national state – church 
relations. On the issue of religious attire for pupils in schools and work places, we see how the 
Turkish and French restrictive legislation is justified with reference to the organising principle 
of secularism, while traditional Dutch accommodating policies is explained for instance with 
reference to the organising structure of pillarisation. In Norway, the official state religion and 
constitutionally grounded privileges of the state church, is similarly held to implicate a 
particular state responsibility to accommodate/ facilitate minority religions. With respect to 
the wearing of religious attire in schools, the very existence of a Christian intention clause for 
educational institutions makes it unacceptable to deny the expression of other religious 
beliefs, public authorities regularly explain. Only one political party in Norway favours a 
restrictive policy on religious attire in schools. This is the Progressive Party, a member of the 
rightist-populist party family in Europe. The Progressive Party has proposed to ban the 
headscarf in primary and secondary schools on the grounds that one cannot ‘tolerate that girls 
in such a young age are systematically indoctrinated to accept that women are subordinate and 
can be suppressed as adults’. It has also argued that the headscarf works to exclude children 
from the school community when they are dressed in a way that will ‘stigmatize’ them. 5 
On church – state relations, there is obviously no common European model, and none 
on the general accommodation of religious pluralism. Yet state support for church institutions, 
respect for the self-determination of religious communities and the extension of privileges to a 
growing circle of religious organisations, is now held ‘to be the norm in most countries’. 6  In 
a broad European comparison, Zsolt Enyedi observes a kind of European standardisation, and 
at the same time, that domestic factors seems to be less and less able to account for the 
dynamic of church and state relations. International organisations are major players in shaping 
national patterns particularly on issues related to discrimination among churches.  Enyedi 
refers to legislative drafts in countries like Georgia, Russia, Estonia and Romania which 
aimed to restrict the rights of religious minorities, and how these all were – in the end – 
withdrawn, modified or vetoed, largely as a result of international pressure. But the 
contributions of the European Court of Human Rights in this process of standardisation 
Enyedi holds to be modest, leaving wide margins for member states: the court is regularly 
shown to tolerate establishment, differential treatment of mainstream and peripheral churches, 
the denial of church status to certain religious groups. 7 
With regard to larger politics of multiculturalism, it is also a quite general observation 
that pluralism has been accommodated more easily with regard to religious than to ethno-
cultural rights. This holds true even as policies and ideologies of multiculturalism is seen to 
be in decline on, largely, a cross European scale. But the growing fear of political Islam has 
put new pressure on this most familiar / least controversial dimension of minority 
accommodation.  And much political debate is now constructed in terms of the 
(i)reconcilability of Islam with democratic values.  
To this debate, the European Court of Human Rights has made its distinctive 
contributions. In the headscarf decisions, gender equality principles are seen to collide with 
prescribed religious duties. The court also sanctions perceptions of the headscarf as a 
                                                 
5 Apparent from private bill proposals in parliament, dok. 8:93 (2003-2004). 
6 Z.ENYEDI, ‘Conclusion: Emerging Issues in the Study of Church-State Relations’,  (2003) 2, in West 
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7 The court’s approach to restrictions on the wearing of religious attire in public education could possibly be seen 
as a confirmation of this general approach. Still peculiar, however, is the court’s more subtle  interventions on 
the headscarf issue, as this is observed when one of the court’s judges, in a secret session, met with the Stasi 
commission which prepared the ban on religious symbols in French schools. The judge here presented the 
court’s views on what were acceptable exemptions under article 9 of the ECHR. This way, he actually advised  
the commision on how to design a bill which, in the case of a future complaint, could pass the scrutiny of the 
court. Cf.J.KLAUSEN, The Islamic Challenge,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 175.  
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‘powerful external symbol’. This in turn contributes to remove the issue from one of 
(assessment of) the legitimacy of restrictions of individual rights to (assessments of) the 
illegitimacy of religion as collectivistic pressure politics.  
The court’s reasoning on this issue in Sahin, is cited in length below: 
 
‘Consequently, it is established that institutions of higher education may regulate the 
manifestation of the rites and symbols of a religion by imposing restrictions as to the 
place and manner of such manifestation with the aim of ensuring peaceful co-existence 
between students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and the beliefs of 
others (see, among other authorities, Refah Partisi and Others, cited above, § 95). In 
the Dahlab case, which concerned the teacher of a class of small children, the Court 
stressed among other matters the ‘powerful external symbol’ which her wearing a 
headscarf represented and questioned whether it might have some kind of 
proselytising effect, seeing that it appeared to be imposed on women by a religious 
precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality. It also noted 
that wearing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society should convey to their pupils.’8 
 
The evaluation of the Islamic headscarf as a threat to democratic messages thus echoes the 
Refah decision’s core; on the fundamental opposition between Sharia regime ambitions, and 
democratic values and respect for human rights.  
 
‘The Court notes that, when read together, the offending statements, which contain 
explicit references to the introduction of sharia, are difficult to reconcile with the 
fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the Convention taken as a 
whole.  It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at 
the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from 
Convention values, particularly with regard to criminal law and criminal procedure, its 
rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of public 
and private life in accordance with religious precepts.’9  
 
The decision in Sahin is, then, strongly influenced by the court’s general ambition to curb 
political Islam. That there is continued controversy over the form of this ambition is to put it 
mildly. Commenting on the Refah judgement, Martin Scheinin, a former member of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, criticises the court by stating that it is ‘sufficient’ to state that the 
court, in the above juxtaposition, made an ‘all too sweeping’ reasoning. 10 A similar 
appreciation is actually also made by the dissenting judge in Sahin, here on the assessments of 
the relationship between headscarves and gender equality. The court had made an 
unsubstantiated claim, a purely abstract weighing of concerns: ‘However, what, in fact, is the 
connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgement does not say’.11  
 
3. MULTICULTURAL VULNERABILITIES 
 
                                                 
8 Sahin, supra note 1, 111. 
9 EcrtHR 13 February 2003, Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 72. 
10 M.SCHEININ, ‘How to resolve conflicts between individual and collective rights?’ in M.SCHEININ and R.TOIVANEN 
(eds.), Rethinking Non-discrimination and Minority Rights, (Åbo/Berlin: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi 
University/German Institute for Human Rights, 2004), 219-239. 
11 Sahin, dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens, 11. 
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This is not to deny that gender equality commitments regularly ought to prompt questions 
about women’s minority-within-minorities status. A sharia rule of family law implements 
gender hierarchies which place girls and women in particularly vulnerable positions. But is 
there a ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’ present also in decisions about permitting or 
restricting the use of the religious headscarf?  
One important strand of feminist concern with religion is tied to the citizenship status 
which might follow from particular accommodation politics. The problem has been coined in 
general terms by Aylet Shachar as a paradox of multicultural vulnerability: multiculturalism 
would actually present a threat to citizenship if pro-identity group policies, aimed at levelling 
the playing field among minority groups and the larger society, systematically allow the 
maltreatment of women, effectively annulling their citizenship status.12 Shachar’s primary 
concern is with religiously grounded family law and systems that allow formal legal pluralism 
in this respect. In the context of the present discussion, the parallel question would be whether 
accommodating attitudes to religious attire in public education, can be argued as a special 
protection of religious groups which in effect put restrictions on women’s rights to equality. 
This is clearly the viewpoint of the ECrtHR, from two different angles. Firstly, as a 
view on the meaning of the headscarf itself as a submissive symbol; secondly, as view on 
proselytising effects and the rights and freedoms of others, where, in the court’s opinion, the 
choices of some women, who wear the headscarf, may put undue pressure on other women, 
who would prefer not to wear it.  
Discussing dilemmas of ‘minorities within minorities’, Anne Phillips distinguishes 
between three forms of accommodation policies: extensions, exemptions and autonomy. 
‘Extensions’ covers policies which extend to minorities privileges previously enjoyed only by 
members of the majority – for example, extending a principle of state support for denominational 
schools to include ‘new’ religions. ‘Exemptions’ covers policies which exclude individual 
members of particular groups from requirements that are binding on other citizens – for example, 
allowing types of religious attire even when they breach with general dress regulations. 
‘Autonomy’ covers policies where religious/ cultural communities retain authority in the 
regulation of certain aspects of property or family affairs, and citizens may come under different 
jurisdictions depending on their religious or cultural attachments. This is, Phillips notes, the 
category that has been thought to throw up the hardest cases, when resulting regulations put 
women at a disadvantage in relation to men.13  
The point that she stresses, however, is that ‘the judicial approach’ to dilemmas of gender 
/culture/religion often risk to overcharge actual dilemmas. The judicial approach tends to treat 
(any) equality problem as related to fundamentally opposed principles of justice and 
fundamentally different value systems. But in many cases, there is no deep disagreement; no 
fundamentally opposed understandings of justice that have to be weighed, or balanced. When 
political theory engages with these dilemmas, hard cases are sometimes made harder than they 
are, in order to highlight the resolution.  
In my opinion, this is a helpful way to address the controversial aspects of the ECrtHR’s 
headscarf evaluations. In its general assessment of ‘conflicting values’, the court can be argued to 
make the actual case harder than it is. It ‘constructs’ a decision situation of colliding rights – the 
right to religious manifestation versus the right to gender equality. At the same time, the court 
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A.EISENBERG and J.SPINNER-HAVEL (eds.), Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113-134. 
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sanctions the enlargement of the issue from individual religious rights to collective religious 
ambitions.  
In making these enlargements, I’m quite sure that the court has also weighed another 
risk; that it might provide legitimacy to hostile sentiments in the general public towards 
accommodation of religious minorities. This could still be an (unintended) effect, which 
would run counter to the court’s stated ambitions for a religiously tolerant Europe, as 
expressed also in Sahin: 
 
‘Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a ‘democratic society’. 
Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, 
democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a 
balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from 
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position… Pluralism and democracy 
must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing 
various concessions on the part of individuals or groups of individuals which are 
justified in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic 
society.’14 
 
As an apropos to the discussion in this section, I will briefly report on some severe anti-
pluralist sentiments which are recently captured in two attitudinal surveys in Norway and 
Sweden. Only to a modest degree, are these attitudes seen to distinguish between organised 
and individual aspects of religious pluralism.  
The surveys are on ‘Attitudes towards integration’, and - in terms of religious 
pluralism - particularly focus on integration of Islam. Both surveys reveal strong popular 
resistance to public forms of religious manifestations. About organized forms, the attitudes 
are somewhat less restrictive in Sweden than in Norway. About individual expressions, which 
concentrate on religious attire, attitudes are shown to be quite similar. 
In the Norwegian survey, 80 percent disagreed with a general statement that ‘the 
practice of the Muslim religion’ should be facilitated (‘made easier’). A mere 9 percent 
answered affirmatively. Approximately the same percentage was opposed to ‘education of 
imams in Norway’. 50 percent were opposed to ‘the construction/building of mosques’, and 
no more than approximately 15 percent were positive to this. About 60 percent were opposed 
to the use of headscarves in schools and public employment, while a similar 15 percent 
expressed a positive attitude to this. The only public space where headscarves meet more 
indifference than resistance is ‘the street’. (40 percent are indifferent, 37 percent opposed) 
In the Swedish survey, 65 percent disagreed that the practice of the Muslim religion 
should be facilitated. Approximately 70 percent were opposed to education of imams in 
Sweden. 37 percent were opposed to building mosques. About the same percentage were here 
indifferent, only 16 percent in favour. 57 - 54 percent were opposed to headscarves in schools 
and public employment, while a similar 16 percent expressed a positive attitude. Attitudes to 
the use of headscarves in ‘the street’ are identical with the pattern shown in Norway. The 
Swedish report interprets this greater acceptance of ‘the street’ as support for a more ‘private’ 
expression of religious belief. This report compares attitudes towards the scarf with those 
mapped in a French survey from 2003. The general conclusion is that popular attitudes 
towards the headscarf are largely similar, despite clear differences in French and Swedish 
state approaches to secularism and religious pluralism. 15 
                                                 
14 Sahin, supra note 1, 108 
15 Integrationsverket (2005) Integrationsbarometer 2004. Integrationsverkets skriftserie V, 
Integrerings- og mangfoldsdirektoratet (2006) Integreringsbarometeret 2005 (www.imdi.no) 
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In both Norway and Sweden, clear majorities support the opinion that ‘Islam is not 
compatible’ with basic societal values. The people behind the Swedish report bluntly sum up: 
the survey tells us that there is no recognition of Islam as naturally belonging within the 
religious diversity of society. There would clearly be little inter-religious tolerance 
manifested, if popular opinion were to set the standard alone.  
 
 
 
 
4. RELIGIOUS ATTIRE IN THE PUBLIC CLASSROOM: EUROPEAN 
VARIATIONS  
 
The VEIL project will investigate policies on religious attire in public settings in eight 
European countries; Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Turkey and 
the UK. The project proposal groups France, Turkey and Germany in a category of state 
policies of: ‘established restrictive bans’. The Netherlands and the UK are placed within a 
category of: ‘soft, selective regulation’, while Austria, Denmark and Greece are countries 
with: ‘no restrictive regulation’. The research group of the VEIL project also underscore the 
differences between western and eastern European countries with respect to actual 
controversy over Islamic dress codes.  Sahin provides a more extensive overview of current 
(2005) European regulations. The major points of this overview, concentrated on regulations 
concerning pupils in primary and secondary schools, and students in universities, is repeated 
below. 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Albania are the only member states to have introduced     
regulations on wearing the Islamic headscarf in universities. 
In France, legislation was passed on 15 March 2004 regulating the wearing of signs or dress 
manifesting a religious affiliation in State primary and secondary schools. The legislation 
inserted a new Article L. 141-5-1 in the Education Code which provides: ‘In State primary 
and secondary schools, the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a 
religious affiliation is prohibited. The school rules shall state that the institution of 
disciplinary proceedings shall be preceded by dialogue with the pupil.’ The Act applies to all 
State schools and educational institutions, including post-baccalaureate courses (preparatory 
classes for entrance to the grandes écoles and vocational training courses). It does not apply 
to State universities. In addition, as the circular of 18 May 2004 makes clear, it only concerns 
‘... signs... such as the Islamic headscarf, however named, the kippa or a cross that is 
manifestly oversized, which make the wearer’s religious affiliation immediately identifiable.’ 
In Belgium there is no general ban on wearing religious signs at school. In the French 
Community a decree of 13 March 1994 stipulates that education shall be neutral within the 
Community. Pupils are in principle allowed to wear religious signs. However, they may do so 
only if human rights, the reputation of others, national security, public order, and public 
health and morals are protected and internal rules complied with. Further, teachers must not 
permit religious or philosophical proselytism under their authority or the organisation of 
political militancy by or on behalf of pupils. The decree stipulates that restrictions may be 
imposed by school rules.  
In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, the State education authorities permit Muslim pupils and students to wear the 
Islamic headscarf. 
In Finland and Sweden the veil can be worn at school. However, a distinction is made 
between the burka, the term used to describe the full veil covering the whole of the body and 
the face, and the niqab, a veil covering all the upper body with the exception of the eyes. In 
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Sweden mandatory directives were issued in 2003 by the National Education Agency. These 
allow schools to prohibit the burka and niqab, provided they do so in a spirit of dialogue on 
the common values of equality of the sexes and respect for the democratic principle on which 
the education system is based. 
In the Netherlands, a non-binding directive was issued in 2003: schools may require 
pupils to wear a uniform provided that the rules are not discriminatory and are included in the 
school prospectus and that the punishment for transgressions is not disproportionate. A ban on 
the burka is regarded as justified by the need to be able to identify and communicate with 
pupils.  
In a number of other countries, counting the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia, the issue of the Islamic headscarf does not yet appear to have given rise to any 
detailed legal debate.   
Applying the VEIL categories to this extended overview of countries for regulations of 
students’/pupils religious attire, the ‘established restrictive ban’ category can then be seen to 
cover the following countries: Albania, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and France. The ‘soft, selective 
regulation’ category would cover the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden, with UK possibly 
moving in this direction. The ‘no regulation’ category would cover UK, Austria, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. If this categorization is reliable, it leaves us with an obvious conclusion: in most 
countries, manifestations of religious pluralism in the public classroom are, with regard to 
pupils /students’ religious attire, mainly permitted.  When the ECrtHR states that, ‘the role of 
the national decision-making body must be given special importance… in view of the 
diversity of approaches taken by national authorities on the issue’16its own overview actually 
tells us differently. Only four countries rule the headscarf out of schools. Three countries has 
recently drawn a new line, at the face veil and fully covering clothing. The rest – here 
counting 12 countries - have not at all, through national guidelines, restricted the use of 
religious attire for pupils / students. 
 
5. HIJAB IN THE WORK PLACE: HEADSCARF BANS AS ILLEGAL GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
The information in Sahin is concentrated on regulations for pupils / students. In general, both 
religious based and gender based work place discrimination would be prohibited in national 
anti-discrimination legislation and disputes over headscarf ban will thus be decided by  
national ombuds and commissions and by the courts. The Dahlab case, which the ECrtHR 
ruled ‘inadmissible’, concerned a Swiss primary school teacher who converted to Islam and 
wore the headscarf for three years before being instructed by Swiss school authorities to 
remove it when teaching. The Swiss Federal Court accepted the interference with her freedom 
to manifest her religion as justified by the need to protect the right of State school pupils to be 
taught in a context of denominational neutrality, even though there had been no complaints 
from pupils or parents, either about her religious attire or her teaching. In turn, the ECrtHR 
also accepted the remarks made by this court on the relationship between Islamic dress codes 
and principles of gender equality. In Dahlab, this is formulated as follows: 
 
‘It cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of 
proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which 
is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with 
the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing 
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of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above 
all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must 
convey to their pupils.’  17 
 
In Sahin, references are further made to the German Constitutional Court ruling, in the Ludin 
case (2003), that a lack of any express statutory prohibition means that teachers are entitled to 
wear the headscarf. Fereshta Ludin was rejected from a teacher job in Baden-Württemberg 
based on her refusal to remove the headscarf when teaching. The majority of judges took the 
standpoint that the German federal states should be entitled to regulate the permission or 
prohibition of religious attire. The decision emphasized the diverse interpretations concerning 
headscarves made by women wearing them, but also stressed the potential, if ‘abstract’, 
dangers of pupils being confronted with religious arguments contrary to their will. The 
minority of judges held that there was already a legal basis for the prohibition of headscarves 
worn by teachers. They also took the opportunity to echo some general gender equality 
concerns expressed by other courts: a headscarf is a symbol of subordination of women and 
therefore unconstitutional. 18   
According to Berghahn and Rostock, seven Länder have now passed regulations 
which prohibit religious headscarves worn by teachers, in four other, drafts are being 
discussed in legislative assemblies. These legislative efforts have, however, been met with 
(cautious expressed) concern from the committee which supervises the UN Convention on the 
Right of the Child. Interestingly, this committee’s perspective is clearly contrary to the 
dominant ‘neutrality versus proselytizing’ perspective which first appeared in the Dahlab 
case: 
 
‘The Committee (…) is concerned at laws currently under discussion in some Länder 
aiming at banning school teachers wearing headscarves in public schools because it 
does not contribute to the child’s understanding of the rights to freedom of religion 
and to the development of an attitude of tolerance, as promoted in the aims of 
education under article 29 of the convention.’ 19 
 
In Norway, the use of headscarves in work places is generally viewed to be protected by the 
new act which forbids ethnic and religious discrimination.20 But headscarf bans have also 
been held in breach of the prohibition against indirect discrimination in the Gender Equality 
Act. The cases do not specifically address educational institutions. But they specifically 
address the interpretation of gender equality principles. The Norwegian Ombud and Appeals 
board’s assessments can thus be seen to run counter to the generally phrased, decisive 
statements about “colliding rights” in the ECrtHR headscarf decisions. 
A large hotel in the Oslo area had practised an employee uniform code which the hotel 
management claimed was not reconcilable with the use of head coverings. The appeals board 
agreed with the Ombud in her evaluation that this prohibition mainly would have negative 
consequences for women employees using hijab. The uniform code – although gender neutral 
in wording – could thus be seen to produce gender specific discriminatory effects. The 
                                                 
17 Dahlab, supra note 1. 
18Based on S.BERGAHN and P.ROSTOCK, ‘Cultural Diversity, Gender Equality: The German Case’. Paper for the 
conference: Gender equality, cultural diversity: European comparisons and lessons. (Amsterdam, June 2006) 
19 L.SMITH,’Barnerett og foreldrerett’, in N.HØSTMÆLINGEN(ed), Hijab i Norge. Trusel eller menneskerett? 
(Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2004) 207-219. 
20 R.CRAIG, The religious headscarf (hijab) and access to employment under Norwegian antidiscrimination laws. 
Lecture for the the dr.juris. degree, February 2006. To appear in: ’Islam in Europe: Emerging Legal Issues’ .Eds: 
W. C. Durham and T. Lindholm. 
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Ombud compared such restrictions to accommodating uniform regulations within the military 
services (i.e. turbans). She reasoned that for women who wear the hijab because of religious 
reasons, it is a part of the personal integrity. Many of these women would not accept to work 
if they could not use the headscarf - a prohibition would thus entail significant disadvantages 
for these women. 21 
A more recent case concerns a large furniture store were the management demanded 
‘scarf off’ for one of the employees, again with reference to internal dress code regulations. In 
correspondence with the Ombud, the employer also stated that they established the dress code 
from a desire to secure value neutrality. The Ombud found that the promotion of a common 
profile was a legitimate aim, but that the attainment of such aims by forbidding the use of the 
hijab was a disproportionate infringement upon the woman affected, given that the headscarf 
was a part of her personal integrity. Although the Ombud could envision that value-neutrality 
sometimes could be used to legitimize a ban against the hijab, she stated that the facts would 
have to show that the specific workplace had some special need for signalizing value-
neutrality. The Ombud found that the furniture store had no such special need. The employer 
was thus in violation of the prohibition against indirect gender discrimination. 22   
 
6. A NEW DEMARCATION LINE: THE HEADSCARF VERSUS THE FACE VEIL 
 
The overview of national policies on pupils’ and students’ religious attire showed how three 
European countries, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, through national guidelines 
recently have drawn a line at religious attire which implies covering parts of the face and full 
body covering clothing. In Norway, a recent controversy over the niqab has similarly 
contributed to produce new policies on religious attire in schools. Otherwise, official state 
policy has in general underscored a ‘no restrictive regulation’ formula: ‘There are no national 
guidelines concerning the use of Muslim scarves and veils. Nor are initiatives planned in this 
respect. The Education Act regulates conditions in primary and secondary education, and 
contains no regulations about students’ dress at school. This must be decided by each school / 
school owner.’ 23 
In the autumn of 2005, two girls at the secondary level (11. -13. grade) in Oslo came 
to school wearing the niqab, the veil which covers the head and lower part of the face. The 
controversy which followed is illustrative of controversies in many local school contexts in 
different European countries, and is therefore presented in some detail here. First, the school’s 
rector asked the municipal authorities for advice on how to approach the problem, which was 
perceived to create specific educational problems, and also much ‘tension’ in the school 
environment. Municipal authorities answered that it was possible to adopt school specific 
regulations imposing a ban on the niqab. But the local school authorities did not want to adopt 
                                                 
21 Security, health and hygiene may still provide legitimate reasons for justifying a workplace prohibition against 
the religious headscarf. The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (‘Arbeidstilsynet’) has provided written 
guidance to employers on headscarf policies which for example states that an employer can require that the hijab 
be fastened in a specific way for security reasons, that criteria regarding the hijab’s color, design and material 
fabric might be issued etc. See R.CRAIG, The religious headscarf (hijab) and access to employment under 
Norwegian antidiscrimination laws. Lecture for the the dr.juris. degree, February 2006. To appear in: ’Islam in 
Europe: Emerging Legal Issues’ .Eds: W. C. Durham and T. Lindholm, and K. MILE, ’Diskriminering av 
kvinner’, in: N. HØSTMÆLINGEN (ed): Hijab i Norge – trussel eller menneskerettighet? (Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 
2004), 220-230. 
22 Note that the furniture store decision differs on several accounts from the decision by the Danish Supreme 
Court in the Føtex case about religious discrimination, from January 2005. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of 
the store chain’s uniform code, which prohibited any type of head covering and, more generally, all forms of 
religious and political symbols.   
23 e mail from the Directorate for  Education, 29.03.06. 
 11 
school specific regulations, because such would, in case of continued dispute, eventually lead 
to expulsion of the students. This far, the school would not go on its own. Negotiations 
between the school, municipal authorities and the state educational directorate dragged on. 
Only after nearly a year of negotiations, did the municipality finally receive a state sponsored 
‘go ahead’ for a ban on face veils in municipal schools.  This decision of course also implies 
that other municipalities might follow suit. Yet there is no national ban imposed.  
During the period of high controversy in 2005, the Islamic Council in Norway, an 
umbrella organisation for the major mosques and Islamic centres, demanded to be part of the 
negotiations over the niqab, and also issued a press release stating that ‘use of the niqab is not 
obligatory in Islam’.24 The council wanted such problematic cases solved by ‘dialogue not 
prohibition’, and deplored the fact that school authorities had not contacted the council for an 
‘early solution’. According to the Islamic Council, then, it is the religious leaders who 
represent the authoritative voices in matters of proper religious dress for Muslim girls. The 
press release was accompanied by a picture of girls wearing the hijab and the niqab. The text 
under the picture of the hijab read ‘obligatory’, the text under the niqab read ‘voluntary’.25 
This Norwegian case echoes the Luton School case in England, as described for 
instance by Moira Dustin and Anne Phillips.26 This famous dispute was between the school 
and a Muslim pupil wishing to wear the jilbab, where the school – where close to 80 percent 
of the pupils were Muslim - had adopted a uniform which permitted girls to use headscarves, 
but not by this a religious dress that completely covers the body. The girl lost two years of 
schooling before she was accepted at another school that allowed jilbab. The court ruling held 
that the school had not recognized her right to manifest her religion, as protected by the 
Human Rights Act, and had not offered any justification for the restriction its uniform policy 
imposed on this right. The court indicated sympathy for the school’s stance, but stressed that 
sincerely held religious beliefs cannot be dismissed without consideration – ‘it is not for the 
school authorities to pick and choose between religious beliefs or shades of religious belief.’27    
Quite like the niqab controversy in Norway, however, imams of local mosques and scholars 
of Islam willingly provided interpretations as to what was the appropriate dress code for 
Muslim girls. But nationally, such were by no means uniform. The school appealed to the 
House of Lords, which concluded in 2006 that there had been no interference with the girl’s 
right to manifest her beliefs in practice, because there was nothing to stop her from going to 
an alternative school which permitted this kind of dress.  
Baukje Prins and Sawitri Saharso have described a similar case in the Netherlands, 
when four Muslim students of the Amsterdam Regional Education Centre, in spring 2003 
came to school wearing the niqab.28 The school board did not accept this, as they considered 
such dress to be a severe hindrance for communication and identification in the educational 
situation. The girls complained to the Commission on Equal Treatment, maintaining their 
religious duty to hide from the gaze of men, adding that they would remove the niqab when 
they worked, as kindergarten and school teachers, with children. The commission weighed the 
concerns in favour of the school, and the verdict was used by other schools to adjust their 
dress regulations.    
 
7. SOFT DRAWINGS OF THE LINE – A VIABLE POLICY SOLUTION 
                                                 
24 http:/irn.no/cms/index2.php?option=com 
 
25 http:/irn.no/cms/index2.php?option=com 
26 M.DUSTIN and A.PHILLIPS, ‘Gender equality and cultural diversity: the UK experience’, Paper for the 
conference: Gender equality, cultural diversity: European comparisons and lessons. (Amsterdam, June 2006) 
27 Cited from Dustin and Phillips, ibid. 
28 B.PRINS and S.SAHARSO, ‘Cultural diversity, Gender equality: the Dutch case’, Paper for the conference: 
Gender equality, cultural diversity: European comparisons and lessons (Amsterdam: June 2006). 
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In controversies over girls’ and women’s religious attire, a range of liberal principles are 
activated: state neutrality, gender equality, religious freedom, multicultural accommodation. 
Through its headscarf rulings, the ECrtHR has taken a stance in the general political debates 
which now are raging across Europe. As shown in this article, the court sanctions a general 
perception of the headscarf controversy as one of a clash between antagonistic value systems: 
the religious gender hierarchy within Islam versus secular gender equality rights.  
Many European countries with expressed commitments to gender equality and legal 
protections against gender based, ethnic and religious discrimination have not identified the 
issue of religious attire similarly – that is, as an issue of conflicting rights. In Norway, rulings 
by the Gender Equality Ombud, on hijab in the work place, have held headscarf bans in 
breach of the prohibition against indirect discrimination in the Gender Equality Act. The cases 
do not specifically address educational institutions. But they specifically address the 
interpretation of gender equality principles. Importantly, in this setting religious dress is 
treated as an issue of parallel and intersecting equality rights: women’s equal rights to 
religious manifestation and to non-discrimination in the work place. 
Concentrated on the issue of headscarves worn by pupils and students, the standard 
approach in European member states largely seems to allow such religious attire. At the same 
time, recent examples from school situations in the Netherlands, UK and Norway, of students 
wearing the niqab, or the jilbab, all point towards a new possible demarcation line. This also 
includes Swedish and Finnish policy making, where new developments in national guidelines 
for policies on religious attire more clearly differentiate between ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ forms of religious dress in public schools. A softer line than the ‘blanket ban’ 
is being drawn; that is, at the full covering versions of religious dress. The arguments for 
drawing this new line, however, mainly stress gender and religion neutral aspects and rely on 
educational prerequisites and communication needs. In such instances, religious pluralism is 
accommodated and religious symbols accepted in public schools, but still, only the more 
‘discrete’ expressions of belief.  
Such variants of ‘soft, selective’ policies may take the form of national guidelines, or 
be left to the discretion of municipality decision making. Either way, they will, principally 
speaking, disregard the girls’, the parents’, or else the imams’, understandings of exactly what 
the religious duties imply in terms of dress. These selective regulations do not solve the 
problem of potential withdrawal of pupils from public schools. When decided locally, they do 
not solve the problem of disparity in regulations across school districts.  But in my view, 
formal guidelines which are sanctioned by secular authorities still have the clear advantage of 
preventing religious authorities from intervening in local school situations to negotiate at will 
about the proper dress for Muslim girls. In more standardized political consultation processes, 
the voices of the priesthoods must then, eventually, be heard among many others.  
This soft, selective approach still represents a clear contrast to for instance the French 
Stasi Commission’s stated concerns about the state’s obligation to protect children’s and 
young girls’ individual choice– where the chosen response to this obligation, the blanket ban 
in primary and secondary schools, turned out to leave no space for individuals’ choice at all. 
For religious minorities there would be many straight forward, non offensive, grounds 
to accept such limited, selective, guidelines or regulations. Either way, such solutions would 
be greatly preferable to the decisive, but still largely off hand, remarks that are made by 
politicians and judges alike, in parliaments and courtrooms across Europe, on girls’ and 
women’s religious dress symbolizing the clash of antagonistic value systems. Their rhetorical 
effect is to deprive any ‘Muslim woman’ - as such - of individual choice and autonomy, while 
maintaining the irreconcilability of ‘Muslim religious dress’ to ‘European gender equality’.  
